



**TOWARDS A GLOBAL HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT  
EDUCATION: THE CASE OF THE FORD FOUNDATION AND  
THE SÃO PAULO SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,  
BRAZIL**

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5 **ADMINISTRATION, BRAZIL**  
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**ABSTRACT**

This article presents an archival history of the relationship between the US Ford Foundation (FF), and Brazil's pre-eminent business school, EAESP (the São Paulo School of Business Administration), and assesses its lessons for today. Contributing to the literatures on the FF and the Americanization of management education, we show how the aspirations of Thomas Carroll, a leader in post-War management education, for the FF's idealized, and still prevalent, form of 'scientific' business school were thwarted in Brazil. We also show that Carroll secretly engaged with the US-supported Brazilian military dictatorship, suggesting the FF was actively supportive of US foreign policy in Latin America. Yet while Brazilian EAESP actors shaped the school according to their own priorities, and ignored Carroll's, they managed to spend the FF's money. Broader understandings of the FF as a 'dominating' power in management education must therefore be nuanced, taking this subversion into account. More generally, this 'first wave' case in the internationalization of management education has lessons for today's management educators, particularly given the burgeoning interest in global management and global management education. Not least, we argue, historic, as well as cultural, reflexivity is an essential requirement of the global management educator.

**Keywords:** Global Management Education, Ford Foundation, Brazil

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6 As Bertolt Brecht once quipped, better the bad new days than  
7  
8 the good old days. Our members in these various regions are  
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10 seizing the opportunities provided by our globalized scholarly  
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12 network to strengthen their own scholarly capabilities and to  
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14 cultivate their own syntheses of the local and the global  
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18 (Paul Adler, President-elect, Academy of Management  
19  
20 Newsletter, March 2014)  
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22  
23 After all, São Paulo is not East Lansing  
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26 (Ron Boring, 1973b:6)  
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## 28 29 INTRODUCTION

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32 This article is a history of the relationship between the US Ford Foundation (FF), and  
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34 Brazil's pre-eminent business school, the São Paulo Business School (EAESP), part  
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36 of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). It is also an exploration of the relevance of  
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38 that history for contemporary understandings of the past, present, and future of  
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40 management education, and, we would hope, exemplary in its archival methodology.  
41  
42 More specifically we make two sets of interconnected contributions. First, we  
43  
44 contribute to an established 'Americanization' literature which explores the global  
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46 spread of US management ideas and techniques. Within this literature, business  
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48 schools are identified as playing an important role, along with, for example  
49  
50 management consultants, and management textbook publishers (e.g. Sahlin-Andersson  
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52 & Engwall, 2002; Engwall, 2004, Kipping *et al* 2004; Üsdiken & Wasti 2009,  
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54 Alcadipani & Caldas 2012). Key US actors in Americanization at the international  
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3 relations level are the 'Big Three' (Parmar 2012) Philanthropic Foundations –  
4 Carnegie, Rockefeller, and our concern here, the Ford Foundation (Gemelli 1995;  
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7 Khurana 2007, Khurana and Spender 2012). As historians we would argue that the  
8  
9 narrative account of the FF's engagement with the São Paulo Business School we go  
10  
11 on to provide is a contribution to management education knowledge, in and of itself.  
12  
13 This narrative also adds to existing understandings of the 1950s and 1960s efforts by  
14  
15 the FF to shape US management education according to a particular ideal and how this  
16  
17 program was transmitted internationally. This ideal was particularly associated with  
18  
19 Thomas (Tom) Carroll (1914-1971), and remains very much an ideal-type model  
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21 business school in our sector (In its commitment to positivist sciences this ideal is,  
22  
23 according to Van Fleetwood and Wren in this journal, 2005, a hostile environment for  
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25 historians).

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30 Our second set of contributions is to two intellectual themes that have featured in  
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32 AMLE since its beginning. The more pervasive of these is the concern for the  
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34 internationalization and globalization of management education, present from Volume  
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36 1 Number 1 of the journal, in Mintzberg and Gosling (2002), and recurrent ever since  
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38 in concerns, for, for example, cultural intelligence (e.g Ming-Lee et al 2013, Earley  
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40 and Peterson 2004); and editorially, in the need for management educators to make  
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42 business schools more global (Doh, 2008). This has segued in AMLE into analyses of  
43  
44 the future of business schools per se, which include this international/global  
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46 dimension. Significantly, Friga *et al* (2003) present such an analysis grounded in a  
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48 history which gives prominence to the role of the FF in the 1950s USA.

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53 This in turn takes us to the second theme, namely the importance of historical  
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55 perspectives. While less pervasive than the focus on the international aspects of  
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3 management education, AMLE has showcased important contributions to this debate  
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5 (Van Fleetwood and Wren , 2005; Smith 2007; Madansky 2008; Cummings and  
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7 Bridgman 2011). The theoretical commitments of these articles vary from the post-  
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9 structural Foucauldian (Cummings and Bridgman 2011), to traditional historical  
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11 realism (Madansky 2008). However, each one has stressed the value of historical  
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13 understandings per se in management education, and advocated the insights such  
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15 understandings provide into present day management education, and its options for the  
16  
17 future (Friga *et al* 2003 being a case in point). In support of our intention that we turn  
18  
19 this historical lens on ourselves, the community of management educators and our  
20  
21 institutions, we invoke Jim Arbaugh's (2008:6) AMLE editorial challenge, which  
22  
23 recommended scholars:  
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28 ...study classrooms and other aspects of business schools using conceptual  
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30 frameworks and methodological approaches that they would use when studying  
31  
32 other types of organizations.  
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36 Alongside this, and cognisant of Madansky's (2008) AMLE critique of the poor  
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38 quality of business history (admittedly, a different field to management history), we  
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40 note that for all AMLE's commitment to history per se, it has yet to feature work using  
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42 the historian's empirical method of choice, namely archival analysis.  
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## 48 **STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE**

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55 The next major section of the paper is contextualizing. We provide an account of the  
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57 São Paulo School (EAESP), in terms of its current standing, and its broad historical  
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3 parameters, including its founding relationships with various US institutions. This  
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5 provides prima-facie substantiation of our claim for an earlier, significant wave of  
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7 internationalization of management education to that presently identified by Academy  
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9 President-elect Adler. Following on from a brief outline of Brazil's Cold War context,  
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11 and the US's support for the coup d'etat and the military dictatorship that stayed in  
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13 place until 1985, but still in contextualizing mode, we set out the FF's role in the  
14  
15 formation of management education in the US post-WWII, and Tom Carroll's role and  
16  
17 objectives, within that.  
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21 We then move on to discuss the framing and the method through which we scrutinize  
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23 the archive, and then re-assemble our data in a linear timeline, in a section entitled  
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25 'epistemologies of the past and archival method.' This we follow with our archival  
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27 analysis proper, which considers, in turn, the first FF grant of \$100,000, a second  
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29 grant, of \$500,000, and the FF's attempts to make sense of where all the money went.  
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31 Within all these sections we track the success, or, as it turns out, failure of the FF to  
32  
33 install Carroll's idealized business school at EAESP.  
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37 In our discussion, having summarized our contribution to the history of the  
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39 Americanization of management education per se, we move to consider the lessons of  
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41 our analysis for current concerns about the internationalization of the academy of  
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43 management, the globalization of management education, and the role of history in  
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45 management education.  
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## 52 53 **CONTEXTUALIZING EAESP AND THE FF IN BRAZIL**

### 54 55 56 **The São Paulo School of Business (EAESP)**

EAESP is one of several schools and institutions of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, (FGV) named for Brazil's President from 1930 to 1945, and 1951 to 1954. FGV is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, where there is a sister school of Public Administration and Management (EBAPE, which, notably, has replaced INSEAD as a partner in the delivery of the International Masters in Practicing Management presented by Gosling and Mintzberg, 2002 in the first issue of AMLE, see above).

EAESP is Brazil's pre-eminent business school. It is 'a full service' school offering undergraduate, post-graduate specialist and generalist masters training, doctoral training, and executive education. It is the home of Brazil's leading management research journal, *RAE*, and the practitioner journal *RAE-Executivo*. It has nine departments covering the archetypal range of management disciplines across the hard/soft continuum, from operations management, through strategy, and marketing, to general management and HRM. It also has departments of law and of public administration. It is triple-accredited by the AACSB, EQUIS, and AMBA, and we return to the significance of this status for our analysis in our discussion section at the end of the article.

Although it was not the first business school in Brazil, EAESP was able to consolidate itself as a leader and role model for similar schools there from the mid-late 1950s. This was particularly through the US support, intellectual and financial, that it was able to garner, as we go on to show. According to Alcadipani and Bertero's Portuguese language account (2014) EAESP has always been a 'hybrid' school, with Brazilian and US features. This hybridity is typical of business schools formed with US support around the world (Kipping *et al* 2004). In 1954 EAESP's founding partners – FGV and the Brazilian and US governments - agreed that the US would send an academic



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2  
3 mission from Michigan State University (MSU), in East Lansing, to set up the school.  
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5 At this stage, the FF was not involved. Funding and overall coordination was  
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7 undertaken by US-ICA, the International Cooperation Agency, which later became  
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9 US-AID. MSU was to provide faculty members to establish the school, develop its  
10  
11 curriculum, and provide MBA training at in East Lansing for Brazilians, along with  
12  
13 enabling short visits to Harvard, in order to build a cadre of Brazilian management  
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15 professors (in the general sense of academic educators). The intention was that not  
16  
17 only would this cadre deliver management education to the emergent class of  
18  
19 professional managers in Brazil centered on São Paulo; they would in turn train  
20  
21 faculty to work at other institutions, set up within existing universities in Brazil (Reed,  
22  
23 1960; Anderson, 1986). In 1960 Reed stated that after only six years of existence, ‘it  
24  
25 is believed EAESP has more faculty members with Masters degrees in Business  
26  
27 Administration than do all the universities of Brazil combined’ (Reed 1960: 2).  
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36 Founded in 1954, EAESP celebrated its 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in 2014. It has longevity, and  
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38 national, regional, and global standing. In arriving at this point there was, in its early  
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40 days at least, a substantial involvement of US actors: institutions - US-ICA/USAID,  
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42 the FF, MSU - and of individuals – for example Dole Anderson of MSU, and behind  
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44 the scenes at MSU, its President John Hannah, who himself was to become head of  
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46 US-AID (Anderson 1986). Notable among these individuals in the history of  
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48 management education generally, is the academic-practitioner, Thomas Carroll. This  
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50 all underlines our point, with respect to the AoM’s current aspirations, that  
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52 internationalization, with the USA as a ‘sender’ of management knowledge (to use the  
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54 term widespread in the Americanization of management knowledge literature (eg  
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Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002), is not new. Building on President-elect Adler's citation of Bertolt Brecht, if we are to take the case made in these pages for the value of historical understanding, the point is not whether the old days were good, and the new days are bad. Rather it is about how the past (the old) shapes the present, and our understandings of the future (the new); and again, we cite Friga *et al* (2003) as an example of modeling the future of the business school which is conscious of this.

### **The Brazilian Cold War Context.**

The events presented in this article take place during the Cold War 1945 – 1989. While so called because there was never an actual 'hot' war between its protagonists, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it did play out militarily, in open adversarial wars (Korea, Vietnam) and in military support for authoritarian regimes friendly to either the USSR or the USA. Notable cases of the former are Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and of the latter, in Latin America are Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. Here the USA was deeply implicated in the military overthrow of Brazil's democratic government in 1964, and in supporting a regime (with various internal changes of Presidency) that remained in place until 1985 (Parker 2011, Tavares 2014). This was only five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, subject to Marxist-Leninist centrally planned authoritarianism, Brazil sought to maintain a quasi-market and open economy, by the Keynesian/statist standards of the time (Skidmore 1988). Pertinently here, EAESP continued to function during the dictatorship.

## The Ford Foundation, and Thomas Carroll's Role in Management Education

The Ford Foundation (FF) was created in 1936 by Henry Ford to avoid inheritance taxes, to leave his family wealth almost intact (Arnove & Pinede, 2007). Initially the FF's work was modest, focused on Ford's company interests in Detroit. However, by the 1940s the FF held 90% of Ford Motor Company's stocks, making it the richest foundation in the world, and leading to it seeking – and attracting – substantial political and cultural influence (Sutton 1987). According to Friga *et al* (2003:236), citing Schmotter (1998) this materialized in 1954, with its expenditure of \$35million on a 'campaign aimed to make business schools more academic, research based, and analytical—in essence, more like other academic programs at universities'. A driving force behind this initiative was Thomas 'Tom' Carroll, born 1914, who by the age of 26 had become Assistant Dean at Harvard Business School, then, successively after war service, Dean of the Business School at Syracuse and at the University of North Carolina. Carroll joined the Ford Foundation in 1953, where he rose to the rank of Vice-President, before moving on again to become President of Georgetown University, in Washington D.C. in 1960.

In a 1959 article in the Journal of the Academy of Management (JAM, now AMJ) entitled 'A Foundation Expresses its Interests in Higher Education for Business and Management' Carroll himself offers a past/present/future structured account of the development of management education (see our introduction). He notes that the FF's interest in management education arises from a 1948 FF internal committee recommendation that it should direct its resources 'to work for human welfare', and that part of this required '[t]he improvement of the structure, procedures and

administration of our economic organizations' (1959:155). Carroll had been part of this 1948 committee while at Harvard, and it was as a result of its work that the FF decision to focus on US management education was taken. According to Carroll a subsequent ad-hoc group set up by the FF identified the following four priorities:

1. Improving the organization, administration, and performance of economic units
2. Achieving growth, development and economic opportunity without undue instability
3. Clarifying the appropriate role of government in economic life
4. Improving economic relations among nations (Carroll, 1959: 156).

Khurana (2007) and Khurana and Spender (2012) also argue that more generally the FF, the other members of the Big Three, and the US government together perceived science-based management training as an important mechanism via which the US would meet its post-war goals. However, as we have already shown Carroll's 1959 account of the 1948 committee did have an international, as well as internal US dimension. Thus Carroll noted that in 1957 the FF had devoted extra funds to 'accelerate its efforts to strengthen business education in the United States and *thus indirectly throughout the free world*' (1959:160; our emphasis added); and the conclusion of his JAM/AMJ article was entitled 'International Aspects of Business Education'. This stated that the FF was already sponsoring management education initiatives in Europe and Asia, adding

for formal graduate work foreign students come quite often to institutions in the United States. Indeed, the growing prestige of our business schools will probably bring them in increasing numbers. In addition, American professors

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3 may be expected to continue to play for some time to come a significant role in  
4  
5 training teachers and research personnel overseas (Carroll 1959: 164).  
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8 Here, Carroll could be describing the MSU-EAESP relationship. As we go on to  
9  
10 show, as well as setting out the pragmatic intellectual case for internationalization in  
11  
12 this 1959 piece (see also Carroll 1952) Carroll more generally summarized from  
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14 Gordon and Howell's FF commissioned report on business education published in  
15  
16 that same year (Carroll, 1959: 158; Gordon & Howell 1959). Gordon and Howell, and  
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18 Carroll urged business schools take on greater breadth, improved analytical tools, and  
19  
20 stronger requirements in the underlying disciplines, especially 'in economics, the  
21  
22 behavioral sciences, mathematics, and statistics' (Carroll, 1959: 159). According to  
23  
24 Khurana and Spender, using its financial power in the US and abroad, the FF,  
25  
26 influenced strongly by the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA, now  
27  
28 part of Carnegie-Mellon) diffused a business education model that 'called for greater  
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30 disciplinary rigor, greater emphasis on quantitative research among faculty, a more  
31  
32 rigorous selection of students, and systematic training for faculty and students in the  
33  
34 foundational disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, and statistics.'  
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36 (Khurana & Spender, 2012: 9).  
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42 Khurana and Spender (2012), and elsewhere, Khurana *et al.* (2011) argue that the FF  
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44 played an important role in the reshaping of US business education, making it more  
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46 academic and discipline based, driving it towards quantitative, positivist and  
47  
48 economic forms of scholarship. Khurana (2007) identifies Carroll as one of the key  
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50 sponsors of this drive (see also Pooley & Solovey, 2010). By applying the discipline,  
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52 rigor and laws of science to organizations the FF and others 'could build a  
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54 management science the way others engineered a bridge' (Khurana & Spender, 2012:  
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3 9). The FF's success in achieving this goal that led to Khurana *et al.* (2011) labeling it  
4 a 'dominating institution'. According to Khurana *et al.*, dominating institutions possess  
5 three key characteristics. First, they are capable of brokering across different  
6 institutional sectors. Second, dominating institutions can work on legitimizing or  
7 stigmatizing organizations and/or their practices. Finally, they create resource  
8 dependencies with the key organizations they are trying to change. Whether our data  
9 support this categorization of the FF as dominating, according to Khurana *et al.*'s  
10 criteria is a point we return to in our final discussion.  
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21 Contextually, then, we have described the São Paulo school, and the particular  
22 concerns of the FF, notably as represented by Tom Carroll, in his dual capacities as  
23 business school leader and as FF representative. In this, Carroll, and the FF, sought an  
24 expansion of management education within and beyond the USA, and to give it a  
25 particular, positivistic scientific orientation. For the analysis that follows, we should  
26 note that in our timeline, the establishment of the São Paulo school in 1954 coincides  
27 with the launch of the FF US initiative, and pre-dates Carroll's landmark 1959  
28 JAM/AJM paper. Moreover, much of the core work in founding EAESP was carried  
29 out without any FF involvement, with US-ICA and MSU as the main actors (Anderson  
30 1986). Insofar as the FF did have a dominating, or, at least, determinative role in the  
31 development of EAESP, its goals were apparently congruent with those of other  
32 powerful actors. This, again, is a replication of the domestic US scenario described by  
33 Khurana (2007) and Khurana and Spender (2012).  
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### 53 **EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE PAST AND ARCHIVAL METHOD.**

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3 Cooke (1999: 83) points out that the choices made in constructing history – for  
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5 example framing, selecting and ignoring evidence - are by definition shaped by the  
6  
7 present of the historiographer, including its power relations and ideologies. No matter  
8  
9 how exact historical accounts attempt to be, they will never be realist, positivistic  
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11 science. Uniquely (as far as we are aware) for research into Philanthropy and  
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13 Americanization of management education our archival data are from both the USA,  
14  
15 and the ‘receiver’ nation, i.e. Brazil. From Brazil, then, we use minutes of meetings  
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17 held by the EAESP Board of Trustees between 1959 and 1966. This was EAESP’s  
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19 main management body. Its members were representatives of FGV (the parent  
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21 Foundation), US-ICA (which became USAID in 1961), the Brazilian business  
22  
23 community, and EAESP itself. The US source is archival holdings of the Ford  
24  
25 Foundation on the São Paulo School of Business Administration (EAESP) project,  
26  
27 which at the time of our research were held in the FF building in Manhattan, but which  
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29 are now co-located with the Rockefeller Archive in Westchester New York.  
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37 Data analytically, it is increasingly recognized that historians’ accounts of historical  
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39 methodology give those working in management and organization studies little to  
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41 work on by the standards of their own discipline. Apart from a recognition of the  
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43 importance and limits of particular categories of sources, modes of analysis of what  
44  
45 are essentially qualitative data largely go unexplicated (Rowlinson Hassard and  
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47 Decker 2014). We recognize here that archival research is based on data (like all  
48  
49 other data), which are only a partial representation of a particular reality – they are  
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51 depleted evidence of the past, rather than the past-for-itself. We must always recognize  
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53 too, more mundanely, that we can never be sure that archives are complete – put  
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55 simply documents may be missing, or, what is important about organizational  
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3 processes, might not be documented and/or archived. Nor can we assume that the  
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5 events accounted for in the archive are adequately recorded, if indeed we accept that  
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7 adequate recording is possible. However, we can assume that archival records are  
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9 what organizational processes and/or actors required to be recorded. We never can  
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11 claim a wholly 'objective' interpretation of archival data, and recognize even the  
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13 choice of a particular archive is a reflection of a priori conditions of practical and  
14  
15 intellectual possibility. Yet archival research is still of value, as is qualitative research  
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17 more generally.  
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22 Analytically, we initially treat the data as we might interview data, that may be seen,  
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24 with the usual qualitative caveats, as permitting useful representative insight into the  
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26 case as a whole. Second, at the other end of the spectrum, we follow the premise of  
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28 elite interviews (e.g. in the Brazilian context, Cooke, Macau & Wood Jr., 2012), to  
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30 seek data that refer to a specific individual or individuals because of their personal  
31  
32 significance. Here, that person is Tom Carroll. In the first phase of analysis we  
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34 embarked on a process of cyclical data coding and cross referencing. In this, cf Cooke  
35  
36 (1999) our a-priori understandings shaped our data sifting. We were particularly  
37  
38 interested in evidence of the role of the FF, given the significance attributed it in the  
39  
40 Americanization and management education literature. Part of the evidence sought  
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42 was, paradoxically, counter-evidence. That is, we identified evidence of the agency of  
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44 FF actors, and of the coherence of FF ambitions and the extent to which they were  
45  
46 achieved; but also, in counter-evidence, that of the agency of Brazilian actors, and  
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48 other non-FF actors, and the extent to which FF ambitions were thwarted. Next we  
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50 identified the arguments and logics deployed by each set of actors, and how these  
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3 played out in intended and actual material outcomes. The different archives were  
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5 initially read and themed by each of the authors, and then compared, as a form of  
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7 simple triangulation of both sets of codifications. In the second phase, rather more  
8  
9 straightforwardly, we looked for mentions of Thomas Carroll. The third phase was to  
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11 reassemble these two sets of selected fragments from our larger archival holding into a  
12  
13 timeline, to enable sequences of events to become clearer, and also provide insights  
14  
15 into relationships between individual and institutional actors.  
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### 21 **ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: THE FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS TO EAESP**

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24 By the time the FF came onto the EAESP scene in any meaningful way, the latter  
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26 already had a strong relationship with US-ICA, evidenced not least in the latter's  
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28 provision of US\$5m for the actual building of the school, and the original ongoing  
29  
30 funding of the MSU mission, to the tune of another \$500 000 (see Cooke and  
31  
32 Alcadipani 2014). While this had been secured without the FF's involvement, there is  
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34 evidence, below, of informal networks. Despite this largesse, EAESP had faced  
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36 severe financial difficulties since its founding. MSU mission faculty initially hoped  
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38 that the Brazilian business community would fund EAESP. However, unlike the U.S.,  
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40 Brazil did not have a culture of endowment of education institutions. EAESP had  
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42 therefore had to rely financially on its parent Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), and  
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44 ongoing support through the US-ICA 'Point IV' program.  
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#### 49 **The First FF Grant**

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52 The FF's first grant to EAESP is addressed indirectly in Cooke and Alcadipani (2014)  
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54 . Its main purpose was to enable the writing of seven textbooks on management in  
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3 Portuguese, of which only one, or possibly two, books were produced, and the article  
4 is a microhistorical exploration of the detail of the writing, or not of those books.  
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7 Here, we focus on the relationships that led to the award of that first grant, and its  
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9 significance for the longer term FF-EAESP engagement. So, at EAESP's trustees  
10 meeting of September, 1956 (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, September, 1956) it  
11 was suggested that FF grant support could solve the school's financial difficulties. Mr.  
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13 William Ladd representing the American business community in Brazil, proposed the  
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15 FF be approached  
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21 through the intervention of Dean Wyngarden of Michigan State University,  
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23 with the thought in mind that due to existing close relationships between MSU  
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25 and the Ford Foundation such a grant might be obtained on relatively short  
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27 notice' (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, September, 1956: 06).  
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31 At first, support from the FF seemed easily acquired. By December, 1956, EAESP  
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33 Board of Trustees (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, December, 1956) heard that two  
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35 personal contacts had been made with the FF to explore the possibilities of it funding  
36  
37 EAESP. However, on both occasions the response was similar. In a conversation  
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39 with a FF representative at a meeting at MSU in East Lansing, the representative  
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41 perceived  
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45 very little chance of aid because they were concentrating on the Middle East,  
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47 Southern Asia, and Africa, as the areas nearest to the communist dominated  
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49 countries. (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, December, 1956: 07).  
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3 A similar reply was given to the MSU Dean by Thomas Carroll, by then FF vice-  
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5 president. The trustees minutes (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, December, 1956)  
6  
7 state that Carroll thought that EAESP would not be eligible for FF resources because  
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10 Brazil was not in the danger zone. (Minutes of the Board of Trustees,  
11  
12 December, 1956:07)  
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15 At the January 1958 meeting of the EAESP Board of Trustees (Minutes of the Board  
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17 of Trustees, January, 1958), it was noted that a board member was going to write to a  
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19 minister ('Butrick') in the US State Department, asking him to 'take the matter up  
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21 with the Ford Foundation (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, January, 1958: 22).  
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24 Coincidentally or not, by early 1960 the Ford Foundation was showing 'high interest'  
25  
26 (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, March, 1960) in considering a grant application  
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28 from EAESP. In March, 1961, EAESP received the MSU Director of Research for two  
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30 months (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, March, 1961). The purpose of this visit was  
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32 to draw up a proposal to foster academic research at EAESP, which, within EAESP  
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34 was perceived as a crucial step toward establishing a partnership with the FF.  
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36 According to EAESP files (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, May, 1961), the Vice-  
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38 President of FF, Mr. F. F. (sic) Hill, also visited the school in May, 1961, and made it  
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40 clear to the school's Dean that the FF would sponsor the development of research  
41  
42 activities at the school, provided that EAESP sent a report and a plan to be analyzed  
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44 by the FF. The FF representative said it was considering making about US\$100 000  
45  
46 available (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, May, 1961). When this figure was  
47  
48 discussed at the Board of Trustees meeting, one of the Brazilian representatives asked  
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50 EAESP's Dean 'is the Ford Foundation really interested in making such a large  
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52 contribution toward our school?' (Minutes of the Board of Trustees, May, 1961: 5).  
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3 The amount of money FF was willing to make available to EAESP was therefore seen  
4 as substantial. However, the FF said it would only give the money if contributions  
5 were also sought from the business community in Brazil (Minutes of the Board of  
6 Trustees, May, 1961). The subsequent agreement between EAESP and FF received the  
7 blessing of Henry Ford II in person. EAESP's Dean was then invited to a social  
8 function attended by Ford during a visit to Brazil (Minutes of the Board of Trustees,  
9 May, 1961). When Ford was informed that the Dean was present, he was said to be  
10 'very pleased about the Foundation support of the school' (Minutes of the Board of  
11 Trustees, May, 1961: 16).

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24 More money was to follow. That the FF was prepared to make such a commitment  
25 subsequently builds on Authors (2014) claim that, notwithstanding its ostensible  
26 failure to produce textbooks, it was in fact the collateral aims – of for example, getting  
27 faculty to write per se, which they did, in terms of individual book chapters – that  
28 enabled the first FF grant to be seen as a success.

### 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 *Tom Carroll in Brazil*

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39 So, following the textbook project, EAESP sought further financial aid, with the  
40 broader aim of expanding the school per se. In June 1964, a visit to assess EAESP's  
41 'entire situation' was made Thomas Carroll, who by now had become become  
42 President of George Washington University. This was two months after the military  
43 coup which had taken place with US support (Parker 2011, Tavares 2014). Although  
44 he had moved on, Carroll was still a leading figure in the FF, regarded as 'one of the  
45 most important Ford Foundation consultants'. The FF documents that preceded  
46 Carroll's visit (Carroll, 1964a) showed that the FF was unhappy with the lack of  
47 financial support for the school from the Brazilian business community, and that it was

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3 also unsure about the school's capabilities to develop further. Carroll's visit was  
4 intended to review the school's position, and to look at how it might deliver according  
5 to the FF's expectations. In his subsequent confidential memorandum on EAESP,  
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10 Carroll stated that FF should support the school in an area

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12 without which, as I see it, it would be quite impossible for the school to serve  
13 as a viable and dynamic educational institution with great potential for  
14 strengthening the Brazilian economy, specially its private sector. I believe it so  
15 strongly that I would not recommend any further consideration of a grant that  
16 would merely serve to carry into the future the school's status quo (Carroll,  
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1964a: 1).

Carroll clearly believed that EAESP had the capacity to impact Brazil's economic development, and that it was in his power to do something about this. Consistent with his arguments for the reformulation of US management education, and the FF's broader interventions in this area, Carroll believed the FF should support the development of high caliber research capabilities at the school. Carroll's assessment (1964a) offers detailed information about EAESP. He stresses that faculty, although dedicated and vigorous, had low morale due to their low salaries. Undergraduate students who had just finished their studies were earning 'substantially in excess' of the EAESP faculty. Carroll also argued that all professors were 'research minded'. He stated that there was great demand for EAESP courses from potential students and that the school undergraduates at the time were 'serious-minded, hard-working and dedicated'. He also made favorable comments about EAESP students in other programs, saying they were well prepared.

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3 The account of school administration is not so positive, however. Notwithstanding the  
4  
5 successes he sees at EAESP, Carroll is dissatisfied with the competence of its Dean,  
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7 Flavio Sampaio. For Carroll – twice Dean himself – Sampaio lacked the management  
8  
9 skills, academic credentials, and past achievements to justify his position. But he had  
10  
11 just been offered a different position, and Carroll comments ‘no effort should be made  
12  
13 to dissuade him to accept that offer. Speaking more positively, he should be urged to  
14  
15 accept it’ (Carroll, 1964a: 3).

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19 EAESP curricula emanated from MSU, but with the difference, according to Carroll,  
20  
21 that the case method seemed to be more used at EAESP than at MSU. FGV, the  
22  
23 parent Foundation, was seen as being in difficulty and unable to ‘offer any hope of  
24  
25 sustainably increased financial support in the foreseeable future’ (Carroll, 1964a: 6).  
26  
27 Moreover, FGV seemed to be unable to accept that EAESP professors could easily  
28  
29 move from academia to business in order to get better salaries if the situation did not  
30  
31 improve promptly. FGV, headquartered in Rio, was also perceived as not giving  
32  
33 enough autonomy to EAESP, and the business community was depicted as not being  
34  
35 close to the school, even though they were eager to hire its graduates. A copy of the  
36  
37 report was also sent to the U.S. Embassy in Brazil with the comment from the FF’s  
38  
39 Chief Representative in Brazil, Reynold Carlson that ‘since the observations are very  
40  
41 candid, would you kindly restrict the circulation to your colleagues’ (Carlson, 1964b:  
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1). Carroll clearly had procured detailed and intimate information about EAESP.

All this fed into Carroll’s recommendation that FF should give ‘sympathetic’ (1964a:  
6) consideration to EAESP’s request, provided that the school, USAID, FGV and a  
representative of a ‘responsible business leader’ presented it jointly as a ‘consortium’.  
This would ensure that EAESP, would acquire adequate physical facilities; a ‘realistic’

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3 tuition fee structure (though a significant increase in student fees); adequate salaries  
4 for full time faculty so they would be dedicated to the school, and not seek  
5 consultancy income; a plan that would guarantee EAESP financial support from the  
6 business community; and, finally, a school management team that was 'energetic and  
7 informed both as to academic and business matters' (Carroll, 1964a: 4). Such a team  
8 would be respected by the school. So beyond a commitment to rigorous scholarly  
9 research capacity, Carroll's proposal also sought to ensure EAESP's sustainability in  
10 the long term.

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21 But Carroll's support for EAESP was also shaped by another contact. While in Brazil  
22 Carroll met Roberto Campos, the Brazilian economist and the junta's Minister for  
23 Coordination of Economic Development. According to Carroll himself, Campos was  
24 the power behind the dictatorship's economic plan, a view widely supported in other  
25 sources (Skidmore 2008). Campos was an economist who had served previous  
26 Brazilian presidential administrations, but was a significant supporter of, and actor in,  
27 the dictatorship. He had, between 1961 and 1964 been Brazilian ambassador to the  
28 United States; and his pro-US affinities led to him being widely known in Brazil as  
29 'Bob Fields' (a literal translation of Roberto Campos into English). At his death in  
30 2001 he was commemorated by the New York Times as Brazil's 'apostle for the free  
31 market' (Rohter 2001).

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47 We have no evidence that Carroll and Campos, with overlapping terms of office in  
48 Washington DC as President of Georgetown University and Brazilian Ambassador  
49 respectively, knew each other previously. Carroll reports having had dinner at  
50 Campos' ministerial residence, and seemed to respect the former Minister immensely  
51 (Carroll 1964a). Carroll told Campos that he needed to appreciate the strong need for

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3 private management education in Brazil, as something crucial for Brazil's  
4  
5 development and, he argued, all efforts should be made to develop the school as much  
6  
7 as possible. Campos in turn commented that the EAESP salary situation was  
8  
9 untenable, and that it was inevitable that its faculty would continue to seek alternative  
10  
11 income opportunities in the market for their services. The FF files show that Carroll  
12  
13 and Campos had a relationship of trust (Carroll, 1964a), and that the FF more  
14  
15 generally seems to have had important ties with the Brazilian dictatorship. FF's chief  
16  
17 representative Carson had, for example, received an early copy of the dictatorship's  
18  
19 first economic plan. In a letter to Carlson, Carroll (1964b: 1-2) states

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24 I was delighted to know that Campos sent you a confidential copy of his  
25  
26 economic plan. For the good of both, Brazil and the United States, I would  
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28 advise you to find time to go over it and give the benefit of your advice.  
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### 34 **The Second Grant**

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37 In September, 1964 the Ford Foundation grant to EAESP was extended for a period of  
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39 approximately five years, with a project entitled 'Expanded Program of the São Paulo  
40  
41 School of Business and Administration'. The amount released by the FF was  
42  
43 US\$500,000 (Wilhelm, 1964). If EAESP was to meet the matching fund condition of  
44  
45 the grant it would, obviously, obtain double this amount. The FF internal grant  
46  
47 acceptance memorandum justified the grant due to the school being at a critical  
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49 moment after 10 years of existence:  
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53 the inflation in Brazil has created difficulties in maintaining salary levels and  
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55 the school is in danger of losing its younger men recently trained in the United  
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3 States. With salaries meeting 85% of the total resources, the school is having  
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5 difficulties in meeting the collateral needs of library, office machines, and  
6  
7 related services. The school has been cramped for space utilizing some floors  
8  
9 in an old governmental building in downtown São Paulo. (Wilhelm, 1964: 1)

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12 The document also states that the consortium proposed by Carroll had already been  
13  
14 created and was working. The EAESP leadership problem seemed to be solved, as it  
15  
16 had a new director said to have the school's full support (Wilhelm, 1964). All other  
17  
18 conditions proposed by Carroll for EAESP were endorsed by the FF. The FF's  
19  
20 ultimate aim was to have a catalytic strengthening effect in order to establish EAESP  
21  
22 as 'the only first class management training center in Latin America' (Wilhelm, 1964:  
23  
24 3). The project memorandum also argued for the expedient need of forming managers  
25  
26 to meet the needs of Brazilian economic growth and modernization. Furthermore,  
27  
28 Carroll's initial concern to develop high profile, high quality research on Brazilian  
29  
30 issues was an important element of the funding. The total US\$ 500,000 grant was to be  
31  
32 allocated to specific categories of activity: PhD fellowships for Brazilian academics to  
33  
34 study in the U.S. (US\$ 160,000); to research trainees and graduate assistantships (US\$  
35  
36 150,000); salary supplements and allowances for full-time and evening teaching (US\$  
37  
38 75,000); expansion of the research and teaching library (US\$ 25,000); and teaching  
39  
40 materials and equipment for laboratories (US\$ 90,000). The payments were to be staged  
41  
42 from 1965 until 1968 (Wilhelm, 1964: 4).

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45 Overall, the emphasis of the grant can be summarized as being on EAESP producing  
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47 'Brazilianized' management knowledge, which however met standards and categories  
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49 of scientific rigor that Carroll had previously specified for the US business schools, set  
50  
51 out earlier in this article; and the establishment of capacity and the provision of  
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3 financial resources which would make this knowledge the basis of Latin-America  
4 leading management education. This was, we suggest, consistent with the broader  
5 economic liberalizing agenda of the dictatorship. By the Cold War categories of the  
6 time, Brazil was, from the US point of view part of the 'Free World'. But the  
7 dictatorship's political agenda was anything but liberal, in any sense other than  
8 economic. Rather, it was deeply conservative and criminally authoritarian. Critics, real  
9 and imagined, from across the political spectrum, the left and the right, were forced  
10 into exile, and worse. Over 400 Brazilian citizens were killed or disappeared, and the  
11 human rights offences of the dictatorship continue to be investigated (Skidmore 2008;  
12 Tavares 2014). As recently as August 31 2013, the Brazilian news and media  
13 conglomerate O Globo felt compelled to issue a public apology for its role in support  
14 of the dictatorship (O Globo 2013).

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EAESP faculty were not aware of Campos' involvement in the FF project (as far as we are aware), and our revelation of the Campos-Carroll connection is precisely that, a present-day revelation. Soon after his trip to Brazil, Carroll's life was tragically cut short by a heart attack at the age of 51, on July 27<sup>th</sup> 1964. It may have been deliberate subversion on the part of Brazilian actors, ulterior motives or indifference to its detail by the FF's man in Brazil, Reynold Carlson. However, Carroll's plan was to go unfulfilled, apart, that is, from the spending of it funding.

### **The Considerable Mess at the EAESP Teaching Machine**

#### ***The First Ford Foundation Inspection***

In August, 1966, two years after the new grant was agreed with such high hopes, William D. Carmichael, Dean of the S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management at

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Cornell, visited EAESP to evaluate the project (Carmichael, 1966). However, the first thing that Carmichael reports is that is ‘at the time the grant was approved, Gustavo (EAESP Dean) and his colleagues were not informed of the intended allocation of the grant’ (Carmichael, 1966: 1). That is, the school was not aware that the grant had to be spent according to the specific categories shown above. Personnel in the New York FF HQ were astonished by this, but on checking realized that no official communication had actually been sent to EAESP setting the out how the money was to be spent (Widdicombe, 1967a). In an internal memorandum to Carmichael, Widdicombe claims that ‘since Rey Carlson was in rather close contact with the school he did not feel the need to commit much more than skeleton information to paper’ (Widdicombe, 1967a: 1). Carlson was no minor bureaucrat, and clearly had some political clout: he had by that stage moved on from the FF in Brazil, to become Lyndon Johnson’s ambassador in Columbia. (Johnson had, in turn, given the Brazilian military strong support in its staging of the coup d’etat (Parker 2011, Tavares 2014)).

Moreover, EAESP students were paying higher tuition fees, as per the plan, but this meant that ‘the school’s financial situation had improved significantly, altering the school needs, and making the FF categories artificial’, in Carmichael’s (1966) words. Carmichael also warns that ‘next to no progress’ had been made on sending Brazilian professors to study in the US, a key element of the FF sponsorship to EAESP, According to Carmichael:

Enrolment increases have made the 'institutional cost' of springing a senior man free for oversees studies. [sic] Higher salaries, lucrative consulting opportunities, and growing family commitments have also increased the

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3 'individual cost' of embarking on a doctoral program. Moreover, no one in the  
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5 school has yet attained a doctorate, and the dominant attitude (possibly  
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7 reinforced by those who have undertaken but not completed a doctoral  
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9 program) appears to be one of questioning the value of such programs  
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11 (Carmichael, 1966: 3).

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14 This is self-evidently contrary to Carroll's vision of a business and management  
15  
16 academy of scientific standing and legitimacy. Pragmatically, Carmichael (1966)  
17  
18 argues for EAESP to be permitted to flexibly allocate grant money, so that a higher  
19  
20 stipend could be offered to the Brazilians going abroad. He also argues that Brazilian  
21  
22 faculty should be allowed to retain their salaries while studying in the US, and  
23  
24 describes long conversations with Gustavo about the importance of PhD training for  
25  
26 EAESP faculty. Carmichael also remarks that very little progress had been made in  
27  
28 acquiring new books for the school library (Carmichael, 1966). Partly, this was  
29  
30 because the school had not yet moved to its new building and there was insufficient  
31  
32 space to place the new acquisitions. But more to the point, Carmichael found that no  
33  
34 plan had been made by EAESP to use the grant's monetary resources under the library  
35  
36 development heading. In relation to equipment purchase and teaching material, he  
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38 states to be satisfied with the expenditure if 'a liberal interpretation of this category is  
39  
40 allowed' (Carmichael, 1966: 5). It had not been clear what type of activities research  
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42 trainees and graduate assistant expenses should cover, meaning once again that  
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44 EAESP did not get precise information on how to spend this money. This too  
45  
46 undermines the Carroll vision of scientifically rigorous management educators, as  
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48 does Carmichael's reporting that the lack of research trainees was due to the lack of  
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50 research being carried out by EAESP faculty themselves. The 'grant matching' aspect  
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3 of the agreement was another unresolved question, for example whether 'cash in hand'  
4 or 'commitment' to support the school would be required as evidence by the FF.  
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7 Otherwise, the Cornell Dean claims that almost all FF resources were used by EAESP  
8  
9  
10 for what in FF terms was one budgetary sub-category: namely the supplementing of  
11  
12 staff salaries.

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15 As a conclusion, Carmichael (1966) urged the FF to meet EAESP's Dean Gustavo to  
16  
17 discuss the issues raised by his report, and strongly suggested that the FF should urge  
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19 Gustavo to visit similar schools in Latin America, more specifically in Peru and  
20  
21 Mexico. In general terms, Carmichael's (1966) reports makes clear that the FF grant  
22  
23 was not being spent on what the FF was expecting it to be spent, and certainly not on  
24  
25 those aspects of the intellectual and scientific development of the school which would  
26  
27 have been so important to Carroll. As we have said, how this happened is not  
28  
29 absolutely clear, but, at the very least, the elements within FF had some responsibility.  
30  
31 Carmichael (1966) therefore proposed the FF change the grant expenses categories. He  
32  
33 suggests that the allocations to salary supplements and the research trainee and  
34  
35 graduate assistants to be merged into a new category called 'salary supplement and  
36  
37 student assistance' (Carmichael, 1966: 6). This would require a budget of US\$  
38  
39 225,000, from the outstanding stage payments, all of which would be channeled into  
40  
41 the student loan fund for EAESP tuition. The income so derived would enable the  
42  
43 supplementation of EAESP faculty salaries. Carmichael's recommendations were  
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45 accepted in full by the FF, and the loan scheme established at that time still exists.  
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### 50 51 ***Grant in Turmoil***

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54 Carmichael's concerns led to the FF's new representative in Brazil meeting Dean  
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56 Gustavo in early January, 1967 (Widdicombe, 1967b). The FF seemed particularly  
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3 worried about the situation concerning Brazilians not training in the US as first agreed,  
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5 and about the library. Gustavo was however highly well regarded by the FF, and seen  
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7 as doing a great job. In the meeting, the FF representative stressed the importance of  
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9 doctoral training for the Brazilian faculty, as something that had to be done for the  
10  
11 school's future (Widdicombe, 1967b). Gustavo in return emphasized the need to  
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13 expand the school's faculty by hiring more people and sending them to the US so that  
14  
15 they could get a master's degree. These new staff, once they had returned, could also  
16  
17 cover for the more senior staff who would go to the US to do a PhD. The library issue  
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19 was also discussed in depth (Widdicombe, 1967b).  
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24 According to Malferrari (1968) EAESP was particularly concerned about the need to  
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26 spend the grant money on the specific categories, because it had come to rely on the  
27  
28 non-constrained allocation of the FF money, not least for faculty salary increases. That  
29  
30 EAESP had to follow FF grant categories was considered a 'severe blow' to the  
31  
32 school's ambitions, and it had to act promptly to arrange other monetary sources to  
33  
34 cover the loss. However, once again, FF requirements were not clearly conveyed to  
35  
36 EAESP (Sá e Silva, 1968). Little progress was made sending Brazilian faculty to the  
37  
38 US for PhD study, nor in sorting out the library. According to an FF internal  
39  
40 memorandum of October, 1967 action was needed to 'clear up what appears to be a  
41  
42 considerable mess' (Minitzas, 1967: 1) . By the end of 1967, Dean Carmichael and  
43  
44 the FF representative in Brazil were advising the FF to suspend payments to EAESP  
45  
46 'until we and the Brazilians have put the project back on its originally intended track'  
47  
48 (Carmichael, 1967: 1). The grant's suspension made the Brazilian school react in the  
49  
50 form of a long letter to the FF (Sá e Silva, 1968). In general terms, Gustavo argued  
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52 that at first the school was not made aware that the grant approved was attached to  
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3 particular types of use. It was only after 14 months that it had been advised it was  
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5 using the money 'for purposes that were incompatible with those for which the grant  
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7 had been approved' (Sá e Silva, 1968: 1). Gustavo also argued that

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10 the possible misunderstandings are due to the lack of adequate communication  
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12 between the Foundation and the School. Had the terms, which in the Ford  
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14 Foundation's opinion not correspond to the objectives of the grant, been known  
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16 on the occasion of the negotiation, it can be imagined that that the grant had  
17  
18 been refused by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. In effect, the São Paulo  
19  
20 School of Management was not prepared at the time to launch a training  
21  
22 program for its professors within the scale expected by the Ford Foundation,  
23  
24 without a total break in its expansion program to which it was already  
25  
26 committed. And, if today it is possible for it to comply with the exigencies of  
27  
28 the Ford Foundation, it is done not without great sacrifices (Sá e Silva, 1968: 1-  
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35 Here, local conditions and priorities underpin the logic deployed against Carroll's  
36  
37 vision. And, as the letter concludes

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40 [a]lthough the objectives believed legitimate by the Ford Foundation are  
41  
42 completely defensible per se, they are not, in our view, the only ones or  
43  
44 necessarily the best ways to solve our present problems' (Sá e Silva, 1968: 12).  
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48  
49 The school's growth in this period was impressive. In 1963 EAESP had 93 full and  
50  
51 part time faculty members as well as 1,046 students in all its courses. In 1972, it had  
52  
53 188 faculty and 2,465 students; that is, in ten years, more or less, it doubled in size. On  
54  
55 its own terms it had been very successful, and the FF's money had clearly been helpful  
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3 in this respect. It had not, however, spent the money on what Carroll, or the FF had  
4  
5 intended.  
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### 8 ***The Resolution***

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11 In January, 1968, Gustavo and another new FF representative, met to try to establish  
12  
13 new terms under which EAESP could receive the remaining grant money (Bell, 1968).

14  
15 Gustavo proposed that US professors should come to EAESP to offer doctoral training  
16  
17 for Brazilian academics. He argued that the school was 'overwhelmed by the demands  
18  
19 for training and consulting from the Paulista business community'. The FF response  
20  
21 was that there were problems with this type of PhD program, and that the school had  
22  
23 to balance immediate need with the long term development of intellectual quality in  
24  
25 the school. Gustavo's proposal was rejected, the FF insisting that EAESP should send  
26  
27 its faculty to the US for doctoral education. It agreed to extend the grant into 1973, ie  
28  
29 for another five years; and to an extent this worked. By then, 10 EAESP academics  
30  
31 had embarked on PhD training. Six had completed their doctorates; two were in  
32  
33 Brazil and expected to finish their dissertation by mid- 1974; one was still in the US;  
34  
35 and one did not complete (Boring, 1973). Since 1954, 60 EAESP faculty members had  
36  
37 received US master's degrees through US-ICA/US-AID sponsorship, however, and  
38  
39 those receiving doctorates were a smaller elite group, and never a substantial part of  
40  
41 the EAESP faculty body.  
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### 46 ***Closing Down the Grant***

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49 In June 1972 George Ferris and Thomas Hill made the penultimate FF visit to the  
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51 EAESP. They spoke to a considerable number of students and faculty, and claimed  
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53 that the early phase of the grant together with other donors' money had 'saved  
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EAESP from financial ruin' (Ferris & Hill, 1972: 1). They reported EAESP as very successful at training managers, and the school's undergraduate and executive programs were presented in a very favorable light. EAESP was also portrayed as a contributor to Brazil's development through consultancy, even though this was conducted as personal practice by faculty, and was not an institutional endeavor. Simultaneously, EAESP was reported as having 'contributed relatively little knowledge about management in Brazil through research activities' (Ferris & Hill, 1972: 4); and it was a concern that 'faculty are not available to students because they are away consulting' (Ferris & Hill, 1972: 6). Despite the restructuring of the FF grant, salaries were still a problem, equivalent to what an EAESP graduate student would get in her/his first job. This low basic salary was also a key factor in the lack of research activity by EAESP staff, who instead had to concentrate on consultancy. But it was also claimed that 'many of the professional staff were not qualified for this purpose whether by training or by temperament' (Ferris & Hill, 1972: 7). Commenting on this report, the FF's Ron Boring commented that the school was a 'teaching machine' (Boring, 1972: 2) and it was 'still looking, or grasping for the key - the research project or the program - that will bring the school together and help to raise it to the level of academic excellence of which it is capable, but has so far missed' (Boring, 1972: 3). In October, 1973, Boring made the final visit to FGV-EAESP. His view is ambiguous. His overall impression is that the school 'continues to be that of a bustling, slightly frenetic place where eager, 'time is money' people hurry to perform those things that must be done so that they can get on with more important (money making) affairs' (Boring, 1973b: 1) But he also argues that 'EAESP is making a solid and important contribution to professional management in Brazil, a country that continues to ride a crest of spectacular economic growth'

(Boring, 1973b: 3). The school is again portrayed as having considerable difficulties in producing knowledge about the Brazilian business reality and doing the basic work needed to deliver high standards of teaching (e.g. preparing new course material, meeting students after lectures). The relatively small proportion of faculty who were dedicated full time to the school meant that it was not up to US standards. Moreover, morale was low among this dedicated few, because of their poor salaries. Boring described the school environment thus:

‘the organization style of the school in all levels is that of free and open encounter. Faculty members openly disagree with the Dean as well as with each other. Students openly criticize teachers and otherwise evaluate school programs. This freedom of expression may be typical of all universities but I was led to think not. I suspect it is a result of the financial independence most faculty members feel. As they are not dependent on EAESP for their financial wellbeing, they can consider their presence more of a voluntary basis than not.’ (Boring, 1973b: 12)

Boring continues in uncompromising language, which again distances EAESP from Carroll’s ideal. Given the its potential, and compared to other successful institutions, EAESP was an intellectual ‘waste land’, not least as ‘the incentives to be an scholar in EAESP are very low’ (Boring, 1973b: 5). Boring also extends a particularly rich explanation of the problems he sees facing EAESP:

...the reasons for these problems are not difficult to identify. First, EAESP is a business school and as such it is 'world oriented'. The staff, particularly from the core departments, tend to be action prone, problem solvers - not theoreticians. Their values are often as same as those who have been successful

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3 in the business world. They are sophisticated, urbane, and ambitious. Secondly,  
4  
5 because business professors (in this setting, at least) are not scholarly oriented,  
6  
7 they usually do not create a scholarly climate for others. Thirdly, being located  
8  
9 in a large, industrial metropolis, it is far too easy to be seduced by the many  
10  
11 lucrative offers and other business opportunities that naturally come their way.  
12  
13 Also, urban living typically means a higher cost of living and more expensive  
14  
15 social signs of success ('after all, São Paulo is not East Lansing'). Status on and  
16  
17 off campus is usually afforded to those who [succeed] in business, not  
18  
19 academia. Finally, the salaries at EAESP are simply not high enough - and are  
20  
21 not going to be high enough - to counteract these forces' (Boring, 1973b: 5-6).  
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26 He concludes by saying that the school has proven to be a 'fine technical school' that  
27  
28 would progress due to the increase need of management training in Brazil, but that it  
29  
30 was yet to work to its full potential. In an earlier internal document, Boring (1973a)  
31  
32 argues that given the size and importance of FF involvement with EAESP it 'cannot be  
33  
34 put to bed without review' (Boring, 1973a: 1). Boring recognizes FF problems  
35  
36 managing EAESP grant by stating that:  
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40 ...[I]n view of the evident misunderstanding and poor communication that  
41  
42 existed between EAESP and the Foundation when this grant was made, [there]  
43  
44 should be some consideration of the process. The original decision to assist  
45  
46 EAESP may or may not have been sound. That is one issue. But we did a poor  
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48 job of administrating it, undoubtedly losing something in the slippage (could  
49  
50 have said friction), and that is another. (Boring, 1973a: 1)  
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54 Upon receiving the final Boring report, William Carmichael, who had followed  
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56 Carroll's path to become a senior executive in the Ford Foundation, sent an internal  
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3 memorandum stating that ‘with this excellent document on hand, we shall initiate the  
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5 formal grant closing process’ (Carmichael, 1974: 1) That is, Carmichael calls  
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7 ‘excellent’ a report which had been scathing about the EAESP and the FF’s  
8  
9 engagement with it. Carmichael himself, like Carlson and Carroll, had had direct  
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11 hands on involvement in this project, so it might be speculated that this was some kind  
12  
13 of FF bureaucratic ‘hushing up’ of a troubling project. Certainly, as we have noted  
14  
15 throughout our account, Carroll’s vision of a business school grounded in scientific  
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17 rigor seemed defeated at every turn. This is, at least, up until 1974. By the present, as  
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19 the school’s triple accreditation, and its associated research journals of standing  
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21 suggests, something has happened to enable the school to establish its intellectual,  
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23 research standing by international standards. We return to this point in our discussion,  
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27 next.

## DISCUSSION

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36 In his advocacy of rigorous historical awareness in management education, Smith  
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38 (2007:522) argues:

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41 it could be said that a profession or field of study without a memory is a  
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43 profession/field of mad people. “Mad” people possess energy and are excited;  
44  
45 however, they are unwise, as they’ve lost touch with the realities of the present  
46  
47 and lack a connection to the past. We currently run the risk of creating a  
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49 profession of mad people if we as educators don’t expose our students to more  
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51 history and increase their and our memory and understanding of this field of  
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53  
54  
55 study

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3 It behooves us as management educators to avoid this madness in ourselves. If, as  
4  
5 Smith suggests, history is a preventative, this substantiates our claim that that the  
6  
7 historical narrative we have set out is a contribution in and of itself, to our collective  
8  
9 sanity. Further, our contribution to the broader understandings of the Americanization  
10  
11 of management education affirms the view of those researchers (Gemelli, Khurana,  
12  
13 Khurana et al, Khurana and Spender) who have identified the FF as a key player in the  
14  
15 establishment of business schools in their current form not just in the US, but globally.  
16  
17 In this, we have also confirmed the role of Thomas Carroll as a key player. The typical  
18  
19 language of the Americanization of management knowledge, which depicts US actors  
20  
21 as ‘senders’ and those overseas as ‘receivers’ of management knowledge, and Khurana  
22  
23 *et al’s* assessment of the Ford Foundation as a ‘dominating institution’ may not be  
24  
25 wholly contradicted. The three identifying features they identify, rehearsed in our  
26  
27 contextualizing section are clearly present. The evidence shows the FF as *capable of*  
28  
29 *brokering across different institutional sectors* – the US and Brazilian governments,  
30  
31 FGV as a foundation, MSU and EAESP as higher education institutions. Second, if  
32  
33 dominating institutions *can work on legitimizing or stigmatizing organizations and/or*  
34  
35 *their practices* we see much of this in the case – the legitimization of the school in the  
36  
37 first place, particularly, we might suggest, in Carroll’s encounter with Roberto  
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39 Campos; but at the same time, and perhaps, less successful, the stigmatizing of its  
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41 practices, for example, its lack of scholarly activity in the FF’s sense, and the  
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43 commitments of faculty to consultancy. Certainly they did *create resource*  
44  
45 *dependencies with the key organizations they are trying to change*. Yet while  
46  
47 dependent, the change that the FF wanted – or, the FF as represented by Carroll – was  
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49 not to occur, or, not through the FF intervention. This suggests that nuance is required  
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51 when exploring specific, but very important relationships in the internationalization of  
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3 management education in the past, building on the general recognition that ‘hybridity’  
4  
5 was often an outcome of Americanization (Kipping et al 2004) . Such nuance might,  
6  
7 for example, allow for competing agendas *within* the FF, with Carroll’s vision for a  
8  
9 particular, global form of management education that met universal standards of  
10  
11 scientific rigor wherever it was in the world, conflicting with, FF Brazil  
12  
13 Representative Rey Carlson’s pragmatic grasp of the realpolitik of the Brazilian  
14  
15 situation from the perspective of US foreign policy, where, perhaps with a nod and a  
16  
17 wink, he permitted the FF’s money to be spent on staff salaries. Carlson’s motives  
18  
19 may have been to keep ‘Bob Fields’, Roberto Campos, or others in power in Brazil  
20  
21 happy; or simply to see EAESP survive through difficult economic and political times,  
22  
23 perhaps having a deeper personal affinity for both the school and Brazil than visiting  
24  
25 FF consultants could achieve. That he went on to be rewarded by Johnson with the  
26  
27 politically sensitive US Ambassadorship to Colombia suggests that, in the eyes of the  
28  
29 White House, at least, he had been thought capable of providing some useful service,  
30  
31 and does not suggest a slipshod administrator. It is clear, though, that, whether by  
32  
33 accident or not, and consciously or not there was collusion between Carlson and  
34  
35 EAESP which allowed the latter to take the money, but avoid Carroll’s  
36  
37 intellectualizing agenda: again, in at least diverting the will of part of the FF, Brazilian  
38  
39 actors had some agency in limiting its ‘dominating’ power.  
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46 The second set of contributions we claimed to make connected to a substantial interest  
47  
48 in the internationalization and globalization of management education in AMLE, and  
49  
50 to the importance AMLE has attached to history per se. The significances we can  
51  
52 claim with respect to the former are myriad, but that which we see as most important  
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54 is the importance of historical, as well as cultural understanding in international, and  
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3 global management education. To illustrate, the US-supported overthrow of  
4  
5 democracy in 1964 in Brazil still matters to Brazilians, as the liberal-right newspaper  
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7 Folha de São Paulo recently headlined: ‘50 Years After the 1964 Coup, the Military  
8  
9 Dictatorship Still Bothers Brazil’ (24 March 2014). The O Globo public apology for  
10  
11 its role in support of the dictatorship was, as it states, a response to present day  
12  
13 criticisms. Chants in the 2013 Brazilian mass street demonstrations included “A  
14  
15 verdade é dura, a Globo apoiou a ditadura”. (The truth is strong, Globo supported the  
16  
17 dictatorship).

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21 This might, one supposes, be categorized as part of the ‘cultural profile’ of Brazil.  
22  
23 We would argue here that history is demeaned by its categorization as a cultural  
24  
25 variable. Whether or not one accepts this, the general events of the coup d’etat, and the  
26  
27 specifics of the development of management education in Brazil will have occurred  
28  
29 long before many international managers will have begun their careers, and if not, in a  
30  
31 country far away of whom most international managers (the non-Brazilian ones,  
32  
33 noting Fleury and Fleury 2011) will have known very little. Our point is that this  
34  
35 temporal and spatial distance makes the history we describe impossible to incorporate  
36  
37 in the experiential reflection that advocates of cultural intelligence advocate (eg Earley  
38  
39 and Peterson 2004). A US management educator working in Brazil in the present day  
40  
41 might, having read this article, be led to reflect fruitfully on why she or he is there in  
42  
43 the first place, given Brazilian management education capacity, within EAESP, and  
44  
45 EBAPÉ which is, in turn, a small proportion of that available. She or he might also be  
46  
47 helped by knowing that any Brazilian student or participant in their late forties or over  
48  
49 will have spent part of their adult life under a ruthless dictatorship supported by the  
50  
51 USA, and witnessed, and perhaps participated in its overthrow in 1985. This will also  
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3 be true, of course, for the Brazilian colleagues in that age range at meetings of the  
4  
5 Academy of Management in the USA.  
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8 This is not to suggest that there is a wholly prevalent anti-Americanism; as Alcadipani  
9  
10 and Caldas (2012) point out, Brazilians also find aspects of the United States  
11  
12 attractive, and make it a positive point of reference in evaluating what happens in  
13  
14 Brazil, not least in relation to management processes. Moreover, in the period since  
15  
16 the end of the FF intervention, EAESP has achieved the relatively rare 'triple  
17  
18 accreditation' standard – accreditation by the US based AACSB (first achieved in  
19  
20 2000), Europe's EQUIS (2001) and AMBA (2004). This is a far more recent  
21  
22 achievement; but the institutional development required to achieve this standing will  
23  
24 have had to have stretched back into the 1990s and earlier. This in itself is also  
25  
26 evidence of the school's international standing, and its comparability with elite schools  
27  
28 around the globe. While this too may cause non-Brazilian management educators  
29  
30 active there to reflect on the need for their presence, it does too suggest that in the end,  
31  
32 Carroll's desire that EAESP achieve some kind of ideal-type status was eventually  
33  
34 achieved. How this is interpreted is a matter of historiographical choice, which  
35  
36 properly would require further research into events between 1973 and 2000 at EAESP.  
37  
38 In the absence of such research (so far) we could hypothesize, that there was some  
39  
40 critical path which required the establishment of EAESP as the leading school in  
41  
42 Brazil, even if it was teaching led; and that elite position meant that as leading  
43  
44 Brazilian businesses globalized, so its leading school chose to follow suit. What we  
45  
46 have run into, here, though, is what Durepos and Mills (2012) identify as the problem  
47  
48 with beginnings and endings in historiographical analysis. Our beginning and our  
49  
50 ending are those of the FF's intervention. A different history would have emerged had  
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3 we chosen EAESP's engagements with the AACSB, EQUIS, and AMBA – different  
4 in periodicization, institutional and individual actors, and contrary in outcome, as  
5 credibility by US standards would have, this time, been achieved. Paradoxically,  
6  
7  
8 though, triple accreditation does not delete the prior lived experience of those current  
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10  
11 EAESP faculty who lived, and worked, through some or all of the events we described  
12 here. Indeed some of these faculty will have been among those responsible for  
13  
14  
15 EAESP's triple accreditation. So, the history we have set out here, and the  
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17  
18 significances we claim for it still stand; and comparison of more recent, and Cold-War  
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20  
21 EAESP history, in what Durepos and Mills (2014) might call a history of histories,  
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23  
24 reveals EAESP as a hybrid case in point in Kipping et al's (2004) sense.

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26 This hybridity may not just be a consequence of history, but an ongoing strategic  
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28  
29 necessity. While Brazil, a BRIC country, is now a leading global power, Brazil-in-the-  
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31  
32 World operates uniquely – for example Brazilian managers of MNCs, and managers of  
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35 Brazilian MNCs (ie a large component of EAESP's immediate client base) work from  
36  
37  
38 a grounding in hybrid institutions, cultures and histories (Fleury and Fleury 2011).  
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40  
41 Brazil-in-the-World also operates differently in terms of economic policy. In 2009,  
42  
43  
44 then President Lula claimed that Brazil was one of the 'last into the global financial  
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46  
47 crisis, and the first out' (Barber and Wheatley, 2009); and EAESP might, in a broader  
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49  
50 economic history of Brazil, might be enumerated among those institutions which have  
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53 continued to shape its unique economic policy and institutional path, dynamically  
54  
55  
56 changing though it is, even at the time of writing. However, Lula's simultaneous  
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58  
59 remark, that 'the crisis was caused by irrational behavior of white people with blue  
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61  
62 eyes, who before seemed to know everything and now demonstrate they do not know  
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64  
65 anything' (De Gois, 2009) confirms that that broader history, like the one we have

presented here, would for completeness have to take into account cultural-geo-political dimensions. The geo-politics of knowledge is the thread between Lula's worldview, and the account of EAESP and the FF presented here.

Focusing back on the USA, there is also evidence in our analysis that challenges the implication of President-elect Paul Adler that it is the AoM's international members, those in the 'regions' whose 'scholarly capabilities' will be bettered by their engagement with the AoM, and by implication, with its 'domestic' (ie US-American members). For sure, our history is of an institution evading US scholarly norms. Yet one interpretation here is that the Brazilians of EAESP were still 'smarter' than the US actors. Indeed, arguably they ran rings round them. Our proposition is that they did so for the greater good of EAESP, and for management education in Brazil; that they knew better about what would work than the consultants and dominating institutions sent to help them. Counter-arguments to claims that faculty were too over-committed elsewhere are that, in fact, that they were deeply committed to the school (or why were they there at all); and that their representation as 'homo economicus' within the FF does them a disservice. This EAESP commitment was not manifest in research activity of the sort which would have pleased Tom Carroll, but it does explain the evidential ambiguity, that the school is successful and growing, thanks to FF funding, but not in the way the FF would have wished.

Boring's assertion is that, after all, 'São Paulo is not East Lansing', reflects, perhaps, his view of the comparative smartness of US and Brazilian players in their encounter. The tenor of his point is that it is EAESP faculty who are the worldly, sophisticated players located in the cosmopolitan national financial centre, what we now call a World City; and those from Michigan State University, in East Lansing whose culture

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2  
3 is parochial and who are from the periphery. In this sense, the AoM's description of its  
4  
5 US membership as 'domestic', with its resonance of home and homely, is perhaps  
6  
7 more revealing than is intended, and suggests that the AoM will only become truly  
8  
9 international when the learning of its members is seen as necessarily multi-directional  
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11 between 'domestic' and 'international' knowledge centers, and indeed when that  
12  
13 distinction is no longer made.  
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## 20 CONCLUSION

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23 In this article we have tried to demonstrate some of the different levels of  
24  
25 understanding that historical research, and historical insights afford. Once such  
26  
27 insights are 'out there', in the scholarly public domain, it becomes hard to imagine a  
28  
29 scenario wherein they might legitimately be concealed or ignored by management  
30  
31 educators. The implication of this is that historical reflexivity has to become an  
32  
33 essential component of the global management educator's competencies, and imbuing  
34  
35 this in those global managers she or he is educating is an essential task. Difficult  
36  
37 though this might be to achieve, this historically extended reflexivity would enable us  
38  
39 all to come to a deeper and stronger understanding of the good and the bad things that  
40  
41 it is possible to do globally with management education. We have not here separated  
42  
43 the 'good old days' (which, in Brazil's case, weren't all that good) from the 'bad  
44  
45 new days' (which for many of us, are better than the old days). Rather, we have done  
46  
47 the opposite, evidencing Van Fleet and Wren's (2005:54) earlier point in AMLE that  
48  
49 'how we interpret the past affects the way we understand our disciplines in the  
50  
51 present'.  
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